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Abstract—As a promising architectural design for future
Internet, named data networking (NDN) relies on in-network
caching to efficiently deliver name-based content. However, the
in-network caching is vulnerable to cache pollution attacks
(CPA), which can reduce cache hits by violating cache locality
and significantly degrade the overall performance of NDN.
To defend against CPA attacks, the most effective way is to first
detect the attacks and then throttle them. Since the CPA attack
itself has already imposed a huge burden on victims, to avoid
exhausting the remaining resources on the victims for detection
purpose, we expect a lightweight detection solution. We thus
propose ELDA, an Efficient and Lightweight Detection scheme
against cache pollution Attacks, in which we design a Lightweight
Flajolet-Martin (LFM) sketch to monitor the interest traffic. Our
analysis and simulations demonstrate that, by consuming a few
computation and memory resources, ELDA can effectively and
efficiently detect CPA attacks.
Index Terms—cache pollution attack; lightweight Flajolet-
Martin sketch; network traffic monitoring; Named Data Net-
working
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several decades, Internet has evolved from a sim-
ple communication network for point-to-point conversations
to a sophisticated global system that supports communication
needs of all types of services, including packet delivery for
information-intensive business, e-commerce and contents [1],
[2]. Existing Internet architecture relies on IP address to guide
packet transmissions. However, originally designed to suit
the need of connection driven end-to-end communications,
this transmission infrastructure is inefficient in supporting
content oriented applications. As a promising architectural
design for the future Internet, NDN [3], [4] was proposed
to bridge the gap between the current Internet architecture
and the information centric new applications. NDN leverages
in-network caching as well as multipath communication to
implement the name-based content (data) retrieval effectively
and efficiently.
Unfortunately, in-network caches may become victims of
malicious behaviors. A malicious user can violate the content
locality of the in-network caches by performing a cache
pollution attack (CPA) [5], [6]. In this way, it can cause
a large number of cache misses and significantly degrade
quality of services for regular users. There are primarily two
types of CPA attacks: locality-disruption attack (LDA) and
false-locality attack (FLA) [6]. An LDA attack continuously
requests distinct unpopular content, by which it keeps pushing
the unpopular content into the cache of the routers along the
transmission path, and thus squeezing out the popular content.
To perform an FLA attack, the malicious user repeatedly
requests the same set of unpopular content, by which it is able
to keep this set of unpopular content in the cache, and thus
reduce cache hits of content requests from legitimate users.
In NDN, it is difficult for a malicious user to perform the
FLA attack in a conventional way. When a piece of content
is retrieved, the routers on the transmission path will cache a
copy of this content, which will be used to satisfy subsequent
requests for this content [4]. Therefore, the repeated malicious
requests for the same content will be satisfied by the copy
cached in the neighboring routers, and will not be forwarded
to other routers. Thus, repeatedly sending malicious requests
for the same content can only increase this content’s cache
hits in the neighboring routers, i.e., a conventional FLA
attack can only affect the neighboring routers of the malicious
users, rather than the overall NDN network. However, we
successfully construct an FLA attack which can affect the
whole NDN network. In our construction, we smartly throttle
the newly arriving content to prevent the unpopular content
from being squeezed out.
A CPA attack will significantly degrade the performance
of an NDN network. To defend against this attack, several
countermeasures are proposed in the literature. The existing
proactive countermeasure [7] mitigates CPA attacks with
the cost of disturbing regular cache usage. To throttle the
attack traffic accurately, multiple approaches are proposed
to detect CPA attacks [8], [9]. However, both their time
and space complexity are too high. When a CPA attack
happens, the attack itself has already imposed a huge burden
on the victim. Thus, a detection solution should be kept
as lightweight as possible to avoid consuming too many
additional resources and overwhelming the victim. Meanwhile,
the detection scheme should be efficient enough to capture the
symptom of attack traffic at wire speed, when maintaining high
detection accuracy.
To design an efficient and lightweight detection mechanism,
we face multiple challenges:
1) The attacker may mimic legitimate requests, thus the
malicious requests are indistinguishable from the legit-
imate ones. To identify CPA attacks, we need to analyze
these attacks to choose suitable symptoms for detection
purpose.
2) The attackers usually send a huge number of malicious
interests in a short period to perform CPA attacks. How to
accurately and timely capture the symptom of the attack
traffic is a challenge.
3) The CPA attack itself has already consumed a large
number of computation and memory resources of the
victim. Utilizing minimal computation and memory
resources from the victim to detect CPA attacks is not
straightforward.
To handle the aforementioned challenges, we investigate the
impact of CPA attacks in NDN and propose a lightweight
detection solution. Our solution takes advantage of the
difference between the attack traffic and the regular traffic. We
demonstrate that our approach provides a better performance
at a lower cost, and is able to detect both the LDA and the
FLA attack accurately.
Contributions. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We analyze both the LDA and the FLA attack, and
discover a significant symptom in both attacks, by which
we design a across-the-board scheme to detect both of
them.
2) We design a lightweight Flajolet-Martin sketch, namely,
LFM sketch, which can capture the symptom of attack
traffic effectively and efficiently. In addition, we construct
ELDA, an efficient CPA detection solution, which uses
the LFM sketch to monitor interest traffic with high
performance and low resource consumption.
3) We analyze the security of ELDA, and evaluate its
performance in ndnSIM [10].
In Section II, we provide thorough background knowledge
on NDN and introduce the primitives we rely on in our design.
We then present our threat model in Section III. We design
an efficient scheme to detect CPA attacks in Section IV, and
analyze its security in Section V. We study CPA attacks in
NDN and evaluate the effectiveness of our design in Section
VI. We outline the related work in section VII and conclude
in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Named Data Networking
Unlike IP-based architecture, NDN uses hierarchically
structured names rather than IP addresses to guide packet
routing and forwarding.
An NDN user retrieves name-based content by three steps:
(1) To request name-based content (data), a consumer (user)
first sends an interest (data request packet) identified by the
name of the requested content. (2) After having received
this interest packet, a router records this interest and its
ingress interface into its PIT (Pending Interest Table). Note
that the duplicate interests are aggregated to one entry by
appending the ingress interface list. If the requested content
has been cached in its CS (Content Store), it will satisfy this
interest with the cached copy. Otherwise, it will search its FIB
(Forwarding Information Base) to longest match this interest’s
name and find the egress interfaces, and forward this interest
from these interfaces to the next routers. If this interest can not
be satisfied by the routers along its transmission path, it will
reach the corresponding content provider (content producer).
(3) When the content packet is sent back, the router finds the
corresponding PIT entry and forwards the content packet to
all the ingress interfaces listed in the PIT entry. In addition,
the router removes the corresponding PIT entry, and caches
the content packet in its CS.
B. Primitives
1) Flajolet-Martin (FM) Sketch: Flajolet et al. [11] origi-
nally propose FM sketch, which is a bitmap-based counting
algorithm to estimate the number of distinct items (i.e.,
cardinality) among numerous items at a cost of small
memory consumption. The FM sketch first selects a set
of hash functions, and constructs for each hash function a
corresponding bitmap. Note that the size of the bitmap is equal
to the size of the hash value generated by the hash function.
The FM sketch then works as follows (see the example in
Fig.1): (1) It applies the set of hash functions over each
scanned item, generating a set of hash values; (2) It searches
the leftmost “1” bit in each hash value; (3) It aggregates the
search result into a bitmap by setting the bit on the same
position of the bitmap to be “1”. Note that a bitmap is used to
keep track of the position of the leftmost “1” bit in the hash
values generated by the corresponding hash function; (4) It
searches the leftmost “0” bit in each bitmap; (5) It calculates
the arithmetic mean of the indices of the leftmost “0” bits
to estimate the cardinalities of the scanned items. To handle a
new item, the FM sketch performs step (1) to (3), and to obtain
the estimation result, the FM sketch performs step (4) to (5).
The latest version of FM sketch, the hyperloglog FM sketch
[12], is the most effective FM sketch, which uses harmonic
mean rather than the arithmetic mean.
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Fig. 1. The process of the FM sketch
2) Monte Carlo hypothesis test: Monte Carlo hypothesis
test [13] constructs several repeated tests and estimates
the underlying distribution according to the test results.
To provide sufficient samples for all the repeated tests,
Monte Carlo hypothesis test re-uses the latest sample by
randomly re-sampling with replacement from this sample (i.e.,
Bootstrapping). Therefore, Monte Carlo hypothesis test needs
less samples to estimate the underlying distribution compared
to a conventional hypothesis test. We perform a Monte Carlo
hypothesis test by four steps: (1) We acquire a sample of
size n from the interested data; (2) We randomly select an
observation on the sample as a resample, record its value, and
put it back so that it has a chance to be drawn again. In this
way, we generate several resamples of size n from the original
sample; (3) We compute an estimation of the interested data
from each resample, and display all the estimations computed
from the resamples in a histogram, which represents the
sampling distribution of the interested data; (4) we obtain
an appropriate estimation of the interested data according
to the aforementioned distribution and the selected level of
significance.
III. THREAT MODEL
The CPA attacks usually target to violate the content locality
in NDN network caches. When a CPA attack is successfully
performed, the legitimate users will not be able to retrieve the
expected content from the network caches. Instead, they may
need to turn to the distant content provider, which will bring
higher delay and reduce network throughput. CPA attacks can
be characterized into two types, a locality-disruption attack
(LDA) and a false-locality attack (FLA). An LDA attack
continuously requests distinct unpopular content, ruining the
cache content locality. In contrast, an FLA attack repeatedly
requests the same set of unpopular content, creating a false
content locality at caches.
Since an NDN router will discard repeated interests due to
the interest aggregation mechanism in its PIT, a conventional
FLA attack is difficult to be performed, which requires the
attacker to repeatedly solicit the same set of content. However,
we successfully construct a new FLA attack by two steps: (1)
The attacker requests distinct unpopular content to deplete the
content stores of the routers along the critical transmission
path (e.g., gateway routers). (2) The adversary sends a large
number of interests with forged names to overwhelm those
routers’ PIT tables (i.e., an interest flooding attack [14]). In
this way, newly arriving interests will be dropped due to the
insufficiency of PIT space, and thus no new content will arrive.
Consequently, the unpopular content will stay in those routers’
content stores.
To enhance the effect of both the LDA and the FLA
attack, an attacker usually needs to require the compromised
consumers to send an extremely large number of malicious
interests (i.e., interests requesting unpopular content or nonex-
istent content) during a short period. In addition, for both
the LDA and the FLA attack, when sending out malicious
interests, the compromised consumers will use the same name
prefix. In this way, the malicious interests will be forwarded
towards the content provider corresponding to the targeted
name prefix [4], and will converge on the routers along the
critical transmission path in a short period, which will lead
to a situation that the responded content will deplete those
routers’ content stores. In summary, to perform an effective
CPA attack, the attacker always needs to send a large number
of malicious interests in a short period, requesting distinct
content whose names possess the same prefix. Therefore,
when a victim monitors the interests which possess the same
name prefix used during a CPA attack, it can find that the
number of the distinct content requested by the these interests
dramatically increases. This is a significant symptom which
can be used to identify CPA attacks.
IV. AN EFFICIENT AND LIGHTWEIGHT DETECTION OF
CPA ATTACKS IN NDN (ELDA)
In this section, we propose ELDA, an efficient and
lightweight scheme for detecting CPA attacks. Specifically, in
Section IV-A, we provide a strawman solution, in which we
directly rely on the FM sketch (see Section II-B1). This simple
solution, however, is not efficient enough due to the large
number of redundant hash operations performed in the FM
sketch. In Section IV-B, we propose a novel lightweight FM
(LFM) sketch, and design ELDA based on this LFM sketch.
A. A Strawman Solution and Its Limitations
To throttle the CPA attacks accurately in NDN, we need to
find out the name prefixes used by the attacker for sending
malicious interests. When a router monitors the interests
possessing a common name prefix, it can observe that the
number of distinct content requested by these interests would
increase dramatically when the attacker performs a CPA attack
on it (Section III). In general, we can rely on this symptom to
detect CPA attacks in two phases, a traffic monitoring phase
and an attack identification phase. In the traffic monitoring
phase, the router monitors interests possessing a common
name prefix, such that it can find the burst of distinct content
requested by these interests. The FM sketch (Section II-B1)
is designed for estimating the number of distinct items among
numerous scanned items. Thus, in this phase, the router can
simply rely on the FM sketch to monitor the interests which
possess a common name prefix, such that it can find the burst
of the distinct content requested by these interests.
In the attack identification phase, the router periodically
obtains the interest traffic monitoring result (i.e., the estimation
result of the FM sketch), and compares this result with an
empirical threshold. If the result exceeds the threshold, the
router reports a potential CPA attack immediately.
Limitations. To guarantee an accurate traffic monitoring
result, the strawman solution needs to use a large set of hash
functions [11]. Even worse, all the hash functions need to
be called when a new interest is received, and then all the
corresponding bitmaps need to be updated. This requires a
large amount of computation and memory resources.
B. ELDA
1) A Lightweight FM Sketch (LFM sketch): To minimize
the resource consumption during the monitoring phase, we
design a novel lightweight Flajolet-Martin sketch (LFM
sketch), which can efficiently estimate the cardinality of the
requested content.
Since the conventional FM sketch (e.g., the hyperloglog
FM sketch) only uses a small fraction of information in each
generated hash value (i.e., the leftmost “1 bit), it requires to
generate a large number of hash values. Our novel LFM
sketch tries to fully utilize all the bits of a hash value, such
that we can eliminate the unnecessary overhead resulted
from the hash operations. Our LFM sketch outperforms the
existing FM sketch in two aspects. Firstly, we perform less
number of hash operations during the monitoring phase. Our
key idea is to use only one hash function instead of a set of
hash functions. For each scanned item, we first use a hash
function to generate a hash value, and then re-arrange the bits
in this hash value, generating a large number of permutations,
which can be used to replace the hash values generated
by multiple hash functions in the existing FM sketch. As
it is shown in Section V, by using one hash function in
the aforementioned way, we achieve the similar estimation
accuracy as using multiple hash functions. Secondly, we
further optimize our LFM sketch by skipping the permutation
generation process. We present our LFM sketch in Fig. 2 (For
convenience, we also include the steps of the hyperloglog FM
sketch as a comparison), with a detailed explanation in the
following.
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Fig. 2. The process of the LFM sketch
For each incoming item, we first generate a hash value (step
A-1). Compared to the hyperloglog FM sketch algorithm (step
B-1), our LFM sketch significantly reduces the number of
hash operations. To guarantee estimation accuracy, we need
an equal number of random values comparable to the hash
values in the hyperloglog FM sketch. Thus, we split the hash
value into a group of substrings (step A-2.1), and re-arrange
these substrings to generate their permutations (virtual step A-
2.2), which will be used as the hash values in the hyperloglog
FM sketch. We further update a bitmap (step A-3) by setting
its j-th bit as 1, where j is the index of the leftmost “1” bit
of the corresponding permutation. Periodically, we obtain the
index of the leftmost “0” bit in each bitmap, and compute the
harmonic mean of these indices, estimating the cardinality of
the scanned items (step A-4 and A-5).
We further optimize the aforementioned virtual steps (i.e.,
virtual step A-2.2 and virtual step A-2.3), such that we don’t
need to really generate any permutation, and thus improve
performance. Actually, a permutation is related to a re-
arrangement of the elements of an ordered list. If we assign an
identifier to each element in the list according to its position,
a specific permutation procedure can be represented by an
ordered list of these identifiers (i.e., permutation pattern).
These permutation patterns are fixed for whatever we permute.
We can take advantage of the permutation-pattern to obtain the
position of leftmost “1” bit in the corresponding permutation
without generating it. Specifically, we assign an identifier to
each substring of the original hash value. For each substring,
we store the index of its leftmost “1” bit into an index set (step
A-2.2). We can get the index of the leftmost “1” bit in any
permutation by iterating the index set according to the order of
the identifiers in the corresponding permutation pattern (step
A-2.3).
We illustrate our LFM sketch by using an simple example.
Assume the output of the hash function is 8 bits, which
will be spitted into 4 substrings. Let A, B, C, and D be
the identifier of each substring respectively. There are 24
potential permutation patterns, including ABCD, ACBD, etc.
We keep all the permutation patterns in a 24×4 matrix (i.e., a
permutation-pattern matrix). We then estimate the cardinality
of the incoming items following the steps:
(1) As for an incoming item “Na”, we first hash “Na” to
generate an 8 bit hash value “00110110”. We then split this
hash value into 4 substrings, “00”, “11”, “01” and “10”
respectively. Here, A=“00”, “B=11”, “C=01”, “D=10”. We
further obtain the index of the leftmost “1” bit in each
substring A, B, C and D, i.e., -1, 0, 1, 0 (-1 means there
is no “1” bit in a substring), generating an index set {-1,
0, 1, 0}.
(2) To find the leftmost “1” bit in a permutation corresponding
to a selected permutation pattern “ACDB”, we don’t need
to generate the actual permutation (i.e., “00011011”).
Instead, we iterate the index set according to the order
of “ACDB” until having found a non-negative index. For
this case, we start from -1 (i.e., corresponding to “A”),
and then move to 1 (i.e., corresponding to “C”). Since
we have obtained a non-negative index, the iteration ends.
We conclude that the index of the leftmost “1” bit in
permutation “00011011” is 3, because “-1” means there is
no “1” bits in substring “A”, and “1” means there is “1”
bit in the second bit of substring “C”.
(3) We aggregate this result into the corresponding bitmap
(setting the forth bit in the bitmap to be 1).
(4) Periodically, we get the index of the leftmost “0” bit in
each bitmap and return the harmonic mean of these indices
as the final result.
A detailed description of the LFM sketch is provided in
Algorithm 1. On line 2, a new item is hashed, and the
generated hash value is split into M substrings. We find the
leftmost “1” bit in each substring and store the results into
an index set (line 4-5). Line 7 begins a loop to calculate the
index of the leftmost “1” bit in each permutation. For each
permutation, in accordance with the sequence of substring
identifiers in the corresponding permutation pattern, we iterate
the index set to find the first nonegative value and calculate the
index of the leftmost “1” bit in this permutation (line 8-17).
As long as the leftmost “1” bit in this permutation is found, we
aggregate this result into the corresponding bitmap (line 18).
To obtain the estimation result, we search the leftmost “0” bit
in all the bitmaps (line 21), and calculate the harmonic mean
of these positions, obtaining the cardinality estimation of the
scanned items (line 22).
Algorithm 1 LFM Sketch
Input:
T: a new item;
PM[][]: N ×M permutation pattern matrix;
Output:
Est: the estimation of cardinality of the items;
1: while The estimation period is not end do
2: Hash over T to get a hash value h of size L;
3: Split h into a set of M substrings;
4: Search the index of the leftmost 1 bit in each substring;
5: Store the search results into an intex set P[] ;
6: Construct N bitmaps;
7: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
8: offset = 0;
9: for j = 0 to M − 1 do
10: id = PM[i][j];
11: if P[id] != -1 then
12: offset = offset + L/M ;
13: else
14: k = offset + P[id];
15: Break;
16: end if
17: end for
18: Set the k-th bit in the i-th bitmap to be 1;
19: end for
20: end while
21: Search the index of the leftmost 0 bit in each bitmap;
22: Est is the harmonic mean of the search results;
23: Return Est;
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
steps Hyperloglog Lightweight
1 N × δ δ
2 N × (2− (0.5)L−1) M × (2− (0.5)
L
M
−1) +N
3 N N
4 N × log2ϕL N × log2ϕL
5 N N
Theoretical performance comparison. We compare our LFM
sketch with the hyperloglog FM sketch. We assume δ denotes
the computational complexity of a hash operation and ϕ is an
estimation parameter of FM sketch. As it is shown in Table I,
our LFM sketch is much more efficient than the hyperloglog
FM sketch in two aspects: (1) the computational complexity of
step 1 is reduced by a factor of N because the number of the
hash operations is 1 in our LFM sketch; (2) the computational
complexity of step 2 decreases from N × (2 − (0.5)L−1) to
M × (2 − (0.5) LM −1) + N by optimizing the leftmost “1”
bit searching process, since M is exponentially small than
N (detailed in Appendix). In summary, the performance of
our LFM sketch is significantly improved compared to the
hyperloglog FM sketch.
2) Detection Scheme: Based on our LFM sketch, we design
ELDA, an efficient and lightweight scheme for detecting CPA
attacks in NDN. Similar to the strawman solution, ELDA
contains two phases, a traffic monitoring phase and an attack
identification phase.
During the traffic monitoring phase, we apply the LFM
sketch to estimate the number of distinct content being
requested corresponding to each name prefix. During the CPA
identification phase, we compute the interest traffic monitoring
result (i.e., the harmonic mean of the indices for the leftmost
“0” bit in the bitmaps) and compare it with a threshold to
detect a potential CPA attack.
In ELDA, we apply a Monte Carlo hypothesis test to
estimate a proper CPA detection threshold. According to
Chebyshev’s inequality [15], the traffic monitoring results
will fluctuate around their expectation under an upper bound
with high probability. Since this upper bound is related to
the expectation and the standard deviation of the recent
traffic monitoring results, we can estimate it according to
the recent traffic monitoring results so as to get a threshold
for distinguishing CPA attack traffic from regular traffic.
Specifically, we do a Monte Carlo hypothesis test [13] on
the recent traffic monitoring results to verify the detection
accuracy of a candidate detection threshold, in which we
take a pre-set level of significance to indicate whether a
candidate threshold is an accurate estimation of the upper
bound or not. If a test result cannot reach the pre-set level
of significance, we further enlarge the candidate threshold
until we can achieve a qualified test result. We then return
the corresponding candidate threshold. Since the Monte Carlo
hypothesis test can be performed on a small sample, the size
of the sample applied to estimate our detection threshold is
reduced and the performance of ELDA is further improved.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of ELDA is captured by the following lemmas,
theorems and analysis.
Lemma 1: The randomness of the permutations used in
LFM sketch is no worse than the hash values generated in
FM sketch.
Proof: (Sketch) FM sketch relies on a hypothesis that
each hash value is uniformly distributed over the scalar
range or equivalently over the set of binary strings, i.e.,
every bit in this hash value will be 0 or 1 with the same
probability [11]. When using a hash function to generate a
hash value (i.e., a binary string), an intermediate binary string
is first partitioned into a number of substrings (i.e., bundles).
Certain transformations are then performed on these bundles
to propagate randomness further in order to generate a more
random binary string.
The randomness of the binary string can be measured by
the branch number of the aforementioned transformation [16].
Let α be a vector of bundles, and λ be a transformation, then
λ(α) = Mα, where M is a matrix used for the transformation.
The branch number of λ can be computed by B(λ) =
min
α6=0
{w(α)+w(Mα)}, where w is a function used to calculate
the bundle weight (i.e., the number of non-zero bundles). In
LFM sketch, we partition the hash value into a number of
substrings, and generate a large number of permutations of
these substrings. Such a permutation procedure is actually
a linear invertible transformation (i.e., transformation λ) on
the vector of substrings (i.e., α). Thus, for the permutation
procedure, we have: λ(α) = Mα 6= 0. Therefore, the
permutation procedure (i.e., λ) will not reduce the branch
number of the original hash function, and the randomness of
the permutations used in LFM sketch is no worse than the
original hash values generated in FM sketch.
Theorem 1: LFM sketch can achieve approximately the
same estimation accuracy as FM sketch.
Proof: (Sketch) According to Lemma 1, the randomness
of a permutation used in LFM sketch is no worse than a
hash value generated in FM sketch. Although the generated
permutations may contain repeated leftmost substrings, the
probability that two permutations contain the same leftmost
“1” bit is quite small. This probability can be computed as
following:
Pr =
M∑
k=1
(((
1
2
)
L
M
)
K−1
· (1− (1
2
)
L
M
))
2
· 1
M2
=
(1 − (1
2
)
2L
M
·M
)
1− (1
2
)
2L
M
· (1− (1
2
)
L
M )2 · 1
M2
<
1
M2
where M is the number of the substrings used to form a
permutation. According to Theorems in [11], the relations of
the estimation accuracy and the number of the hash values
being used in the FM sketch can be formulated as following:
Bias = 1 + 0.31/N , SE = 0.78/
√
N , where N is the total
number of the hash values generated over a new item, Bias
and SE represent the Bias and Standard Error in the estimate
process respectively. To get enough substrings for generating
N permutations (N should be larger than 1024 [11]), M
is always larger than or equal to 7. Therefore, the whole
randomness reduces little when we use a group of generated
permutations instead of a group of original hash values in the
estimate process, and thus our LFM sketch can achieve similar
estimate accuracy as FM sketch.
ELDA can effectively detect CPA attacks. According
to Theorem 1, LFM sketch can achieve nearly the same
estimation accuracy as FM sketch. ELDA relies on LFM to
monitor the interests possessing a common name prefix, and
thus is able to detect the burst of the distinct content requested
by these interests accurately. In addition, ELDA can identify
a potential CPA attack by using a proper threshold generated
by Monte Carlo test.
VI. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we study the destructive effects of both
the LDA attack and the FLA attack. In addition, we evaluate
ELDA by comparing it with the most effective approach in
the literature.
A. Methodology
Content Provider
Gateway router
Router 1 Router 2 Router 3
Consumer 2 Consumer 3 Consumer 4 Consumer 5 Consumer 7Consumer 6Consumer 1 Consumer 8
Fig. 3. The network topology
We evaluated the performance of ELDA in ndnSIM [10], a
popular NDN simulator. All of our simulations were performed
on a local machine, equipped with an Intel Core i7 3.4G CPU
and 16G RAM, running Ubuntu 13.04 with kernel version
3.8.8. All the primary parameters we used in ndnSIM are
provided in Table II.
In our simulations, we deployed a tree-like network topol-
ogy (see Fig. 3). As the common part of real Internet
topologies, the tree-liked topology is commonly present in the
local networks. CPA attacks traffic will converge at the routers
along the critical transmission path, e.g., the gateway routers.
In this network topology, we deployed eight consumers, three
edge routers, one gateway router and one content provider. We
assume consumer 2, 4 and 7 are malicious (i.e., they have been
compromised by the attacker and only send malicious interset
packets).
To simulate background traffic, each legitimate consumers
sends 3000 regular interests every second. The name of an
interest consists of a name prefix (i.e., the first component
of the name) and a distinct random number (i.e., the second
component of the name). We used five optional name prefixes
throughout our simulations: “/google.com”, “/amazon.com”,
“/youtube.com”, “/yahoo.com” and “/facebook.com”. We ma-
nipulated the random number to distinguish different types of
interests (i.e., regular interests, interests requesting unpopular
content, and interest requesting nonexistent content), such that
a different type of interest will use a random number from
a different range. The request frequency of different content
by legitimate consumers followed three Zipf-like distributions
with different parameters. Their α (the popular content will be
requested more frequently with a larger α) was 0.7, 0.9 and
1.1 respectively, while the number of the different content was
10000.
The PIT size of each router is 15000, and the cache size is
1000 (which is 1% of the total number of distinct content used
in the simulations). Since a CPA attack can significantly affect
the in-network caches using all different types of replacement
strategies [7], we chose LRU (least recently used), which is
commonly used by the in-network caches [17].
To evaluate the damage effect of CPA attacks, all the
compromised consumers send malicious interests following
our attack model described in Section III. The name in a
malicious interest also consists of a name prefix and a random
number. In our simulations, the attacker will use “/yahoo.com”
as the name prefix.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Parameters Value
# Content items 10,000
Link (Gateway to Content provider) 500Mb/s
Link delay (Gateway to Content provider) 20ms
Other link 50Mb/s
Other link delay 3-5ms
CS strategy LRU
CS size 1000 content items
Maximum PIT size 15000 entries
Size of each content item 1,024 bytes
Rate of legitimate users 3000 Interests/s
Duration for Interests 0-60s
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Attack Zipf Attack Intensity
LDA1,FLA1 0.7 3,000 Interests/s
LDA2,FLA2 0.7 6,000 Interests/s
LDA3,FLA3 0.9 3,000 Interests/s
LDA4,FLA4 0.9 6,000 Interests/s
LDA5,FLA5 1.1 3,000 Interests/s
LDA6,FLA6 1.1 6,000 Interests/s
Implementation of ELDA. When implementing ELDA, we
used murmur hash function [18] to generate hash values due
to its efficiency. Each interest name is hashed to a 32-bit hash
string, which is further split into 8 substrings. In this way, we
are able to estimate the cardinality of the requested content
accurately, since we are allowed to use at most 8! bitmaps. In
our implementation, we randomly selected 256 bitmaps. When
using Monte Carlo hypothesis test to obtain the threshold, our
significance level is 0.5%, and the sample size is 10.
Implementation of a baseline scheme. To show the effec-
tiveness of ELDA, we also implemented the most efficient
detection scheme [8] in the literature as a baseline for
comparison. This scheme monitors the interest traffic, and
calculates the number of each newly requested content. It
identifies a CPA attack by checking whether the requesting
frequency of a recently requested content deviates from a
threshold, which was obtained based on the expectation and
the variance of the past requesting frequency for this content.
B. Damage Effect of LDA and FLA Attacks
We evaluated the damage effect of both the LDA and the
FLA attacks in order to justify our threat model.
LDA attacks. We simulated six LDA attacks, LDA1, LDA2,
LDA3, LDA4, LDA5 and LDA6. As listed in Table III, each
compromised consumer sends malicious interests per second
to request unpopular content, while the regular traffic follows
a Zipf-like distribution with a specific α. In these attacks,
the compromised consumers send out malicious interests from
second 2. We have two observations: (1) In LDA2, LDA4 and
LDA6, the CS hit rate in the gateway router drops almost to 0,
and that in LDA1, LDA3 and LDA5 also declines significantly
(see Fig. 4(a)). In LDA5, the number of the attack requests
is only equal to the number of the regular requests and the
larger α (i.e., 1.1) is used to generate regular traffic in this
case. As a result, the cache hit rate maintains at a higher level
compared to the simulation results of the other LDA attacks.
(2) When an LDA attack happens, the average round-trip time
(RTT) of regular interests increases 2 to 3 milliseconds in
terms of different α of the regular traffic and attack frequency
of LDA attacks. When we used a large α and low malicious
request frequency in the simulation, the average RTT increases
more slowly (see Figure 4(b)). We conclude that, the LDA
attacks affect the overall performance of NDN network more
seriously while sending more malicious interests per second.
On the other hand, the LDA attacks degrade the performance
less when the α of the regular traffic is large.
FLA attacks. We also simulated the damage effect of six FLA
attacks, FLA1, FLA2, FLA3, FLA4, FLA5 and FLA6. The
compromised consumers request unpopular content from the
second 2 and request non-existent content from the second
3. The name prefixes of these malicious interests all are
“/yahoo.com. We have three observations: Firstly, when the
compromised consumers send more malicious interests per
second, the performance of the gateway router is degraded
significantly. Secondly, the FLA attacks have the damage
effect on the PIT (see Fig.4(d)), i.e., the available space
of PIT declines to 0 and no more subsequent interests can
be forwarded. In this way, the attacker keeps the unpopular
content in the CS by blocking the subsequent content, and thus
the CS hit rate significantly degrades. Thirdly, the FLA attacks
affect the gateway router more significantly compared to the
LDA attacks (see Fig.4(e)). The FLA attacks delay the average
round-trip time much more compared to the LDA attacks (see
Fig.4(b)).
C. Evaluations of ELDA
In this section, we compare ELDA with the baseline scheme
in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and resource consumption.
We will show that compared to the baseline scheme, ELDA
maintains the same effectiveness while having much better
efficiency and significantly less resource consumption.
The effectiveness of ELDA. To show the effectiveness of
ELDA, we evaluate both the detection rate and the false
positive rate, while performing a series of damage FLA attacks
(the attack intensity is measured in terms of kilo packets per
second, i.e., Kpkts). The detection rate is defined as a ratio
between the number of correctly detected CPA attacks and the
actual number of CPA attacks. A false positive may happen
if the detection scheme falsely classifies a non-attack event as
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Fig. 4. The effect of the CPA attacks
an attack event, and we define the false positive rate as a ratio
between the number of false positives and the total number of
CPA detection events. In Fig. 5, we have two observations: (1)
the detection rates of both ELDA and the baseline scheme are
100%, regardless of α and the malicious request frequency; (2)
the false positive rates of both schemes are zero. We conclude
that both schemes can detect CPA attacks effectively.
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Fig. 5. Attack Detection
The efficiency of ELDA. We evaluate the efficiency of ELDA
in terms of the processing time and the network throughput.
This is measured in terms of kilo packets per second, i.e.,
Kpkts. Since the processing time and the network throughput
are both calculated regardless of the type of request packets
(requesting popular content or unpopular content, and being a
regular request or a malicious request), we did not discriminate
the type of requests and thus set the α value to 0.9 here. As
shown in Fig. 6(a), the baseline scheme needs approximately
4 µs to handle a newly arriving interest, while ELDA only
needs approximately 0.8 µs. Moreover, the baseline scheme
can only process less than 200,000 interest packets per second,
while ELDA is able to process 1,300,000 interest packets per
second(see Fig.6(b)). We conclude that ELDA is much more
efficient than the baseline scheme.
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Resource consumption of ELDA. To evaluate the resource
consumption of ELDA, we traced ELDA’s CPU and memory
usage (see Fig.7). Similarly to the efficiency simulation, we
set the α value to 0.9. When monitoring interest traffic, the
baseline scheme almost monopolizes the CPU, while ELDA
only uses 10% of the CPU. Meanwhile, the baseline scheme
requires more than 100KB memory to monitor a set of
interests, each of which possesses the same name prefix. In
contrast, ELDA only requires 488 bits. To identify the prefix
used by attackers and throttle the corresponding malicious
interests, a router usually needs to monitor interests with
different name prefixes simultaneously. To achieve this, the
baseline scheme may require much more amount of memory.
For example, if the router needs to simultaneously handle
10,000 different name prefixes, the overall memory required
in the baseline scheme will be 1GB, while in ELDA, it will be
only 5MB. Compared to the baseline scheme, ELDA requires
significantly less computation and memory resources.
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VII. RELATED WORK
The CPA attack is a major threat to in-network caches
in the current Internet [5]. Numerous research efforts [19],
[6] have been devoted to mitigate this type of attack. In
particular, they analyze the characteristics of the network flows
in terms of different IP addresses in a certain period, and thus
are able to identify and throttle a malicious client. However,
in NDN, we need to analyze the network traffic in terms
of hierarchically structured packet names, rather than well-
formatted IP addresses. Due to the differences between packet
names and IP addresses in nature, we need to re-design the
CPA detection mechanism for NDN networks [7].
Although CPA attacks will degrade the performance of
NDN networks significantly [20], [7], till now, there is very
limited work on mitigating CPA attacks in NDN. Xie et
al. [7] propose a proactive CPA countermeasure to enhance
cache robustness to CPA attacks without any attack detection
process. In their work, when a router receives a content packet,
it evaluates an exponential function of the requesting frequency
to provide the probability that this content packet will be kept
in the cache. One disadvantage of their work is, it will prevent
caching some potential popular content requested by regular
users. Conti et al. [8] propose a lightweight approach for
detecting LDA attacks. They first point out that the existing
proactive countermeasure [7] is ineffective when defending
against realistic adversaries. They then propose their approach
based on the hit rate records of the received content. Their
solution will consume a large number of computation and
memory resources for storing and iterating these hit rate
records. Some other approaches [21], [9] are also not efficient
enough in a realistic NDN network because they all build on
top of heavyweight primitives like artificial neural network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To mitigate the CPA attacks in NDN, we propose ELDA,
an efficient and lightweight CPA detection scheme. We first
analyze the cache pollution attacks in NDN, discovering a
common attack symptom for both of the LDA attack and the
FLA attack. In addition, we design a novel lightweight FM
sketch (LFM sketch) which can capture the attack symptom
in the interest traffic. Finally, we propose ELDA based on the
LFM sketch. Both the theoretical analysis and the simulations
demonstrate ELDA could effectively and efficiently detect
CPA attacks in NDN.
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APPENDIX
A. Analysis of the Computational Complexity of the Leftmost
“1” Bit Search
We analyze the computational complexity of the leftmost
“1” bit search of FM sketch and LFM sketch as following. To
find the leftmost “1” bit in a hash value, FM sketch searches
the hash value from the leftmost bit, and the computational
complexity is
L∑
k=1
k · (1
2
)
K
, where L is the length of the hash
value. We define a function for formulating this expression:
L(x) =
L∑
k=1
k · xK−1.
Then we can compute it as following:
L(x) = (
∫
L(x)dx)′ =
x− xL
(1− x)2 .
Therefore, considering the number of the hash values (i.e.,
N), the total computational complexity of the leftmost “1” bit
search in FM sketch is N · (2− (1
2
)
L−1
).
In LFM, the computational complexity of finding the
leftmost “1” bit in a generated permutation consists of two
parts. The first part is the computational complexity of
finding the leftmost “1” bit in a hash substring. Similarly,
it is equal to 2 − (1
2
)
L
M
−1
, where M is the number of the
substrings. The second part is the computational complexity
of finding the leftmost “1” bit in a series of hash substrings
that compose a permutation used in LFM sketch. In this
process, we find the first nonzero hash substring and return
its leftmost “1” bit as a result. In a similar way, when L
M
> 2,
the computational complexity of finding such a substring is
equal to
M∑
k=1
k((1
2
)
L
M )
K−1
· (1− (1
2
)
L
M ), which is less than
1. Therefore, in summary, the computational complexity of
finding the leftmost “1” bit in a generated permutation is less
than M · (2 − (1
2
)
L
M
−1
) +N .
